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Case No. 960375-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This appeal arises from convictions for distribution of a 
controlled substances within 100 feet of a church, a second 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (ii) 
(1995), and distribution of a controlled substance, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1) (a) (ii) 
(1995). This Court has jurisdiction over the appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann, § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court commit plain error in allowing the 
State or any of the State's witnesses to comment on the 
confidential informant's credibility in the face of defendant's 
failure to object? As a general rule, appellate courts will not 
consider an issue raised for the first time on appeal, unless the 
trial court committed plain error or the case involves 
exceptional circumstances. See, e,g,. State V, Cook, 881 P.2d 
913# 914 (Utah App. 1994); State v. Brown. 856 P.2d 358, 359 
(Utah App. 1993). Because defendant failed to object, the issues 
of error, obviousness of error, and prejudice, see State v. Dunn. 
850 P.2d 1201, 1208-09 (Utah 1993), are matters of law for this 
Court to decide. 
2. Was defendant denied effective assistance of counsel 
when his trial counsel failed to object to the prosecutor's 
remarks in opening statement, or any of the State's witnesses' 
comments, regarding the confidential informant's supplying "good 
information" in prior drug cases? "When . . . the claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel is raised for the first time on 
appeal, [the appellate court] resolve[s] the issue as a matter of 
law." State v. Strain. 885 P.2d 810, 814 (Utah 1994). In order 
to prevail on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a 
defendant must establish (1) that his counsels performance "fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness;" and (2) that 
counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant. Id. at (citing 
Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668, 688, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 
2064 (1984)) . 
2 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Rule 608 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides: 
(a) Opinion and reputation evidence of character. The 
credibility of a witness may be attacked or supported by evidence 
in the form of opinion or reputation, but subject to these 
limitations: (1) the evidence may refer only to character for 
truthfulness or untruthfulness, and (2) evidence of truthful 
character is admissible only after the character of the witness 
for truthfulness has been attacked by opinion or reputation 
evidence or otherwise. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASS 
Defendant was charged by information with distribution of a 
controlled substance within 1000 feet of a church, a second 
degree felony (Count I), and with distribution of a controlled 
substance, a third degree felony (Count II) (R. 1-2). A jury 
found defendant guilty of both counts (R. 76-77). The trial 
court sentenced defendant to concurrent prison terms of one-to-
fifteen years and zero-to-five years (R. 81). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In January 1995, after Adam Black had left prison and was on 
parole, he began giving his parole officer information about 
other parolees who were violating their parole and committing 
crimes (R. 190, 192). After Black's information lead to several 
arrests, the Weber-Morgan Narcotics Strike Force began using him 
as an confidential informant (R. 192-93, 198). After his release 
3 
from prison, Black become reacquainted with defendant, whom he 
recognized from the Utah State Prison (R. 330-31, 390-91, 397) . 
Black would see defendant daily at the Red Duck, a convenience 
store where Black worked and where defendant frequently shopped 
(R. 337, 541)• Black and defendant became friends and Black 
visited defendant's apartment on several occasions (R. 350, 401-
02, 542, 562) . 
After defendant offered to sell Black drugs, Black informed 
his parole officer, Blake Woodring (R. 196, 340) . Woodring 
contacted the Weber-Morgan Strike Force and arranged to use Black 
as a confidential informant to purchase narcotics from defendant 
(R. 193, 477). 
On October 26, 1995, Black, fitted with a wire transmitter, 
attempted to purchase narcotics from defendant. However, 
defendant declined to make a sale on that occasion because 
officers were executing a search warrant for drugs at a house 
across the street (R. 345, 349, 399, 488) . Defendant told Black 
there was "too much heat" and to come back later (R. 349, 489).1 
On October 30, 1995, a controlled buy was arranged and 
1
 Officer Lyle Bayless monitored the conversation between 
defendant and Black on October 26, 1995 (R. 487-89). Although he 
did not then know defendant, the voice he heard was similar to 
defendant's (R. 489). 
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completed between Black and defendant at defendant's apartment 
(R. 350). Before heading up to defendant's apartment, Black 
stopped to tell some individuals in the parking lot that he was 
going to buy some marijuana from defendant (R. 360). An 
unidentified male answered when Black knocked on defendant's 
door. Black asked for defendant and was invited into defendant's 
apartment (R. 299). Black had a brief conversation with this man 
about buying some stolen stereos (R. 362) . After a couple of 
minutes, defendant appeared and Black asked him if he had his 
"stuff" (R. 300). Defendant responded that he did and then left 
to retrieve two bags of marijuana (R. 300, 363-64) . Black 
briefly squabbled with defendant about the marijuana not 
amounting to an ounce (R. 364) . Once satisfied there was indeed 
an ounce divided between the two bags, Black handed defendant 
$250 for the drugs (R. 364). When asked by Black if he could get 
more drugs "real quick," defendant said wyes" (R. 365). Officers 
Laplant and Elliott, who had earlier fitted defendant with a wire 
transmitter and watched him approach defendant's apartment, 
monitored this conversation (R. 260-65, 295-300). The distance 
from defendant's apartment and the First Baptist Church was later 
measured and determined to be to 472 feet (R. 461). 
On November 13, 1995, a second controlled exchange between 
5 
Black and defendant took place (R. 368) . Black called Agent 
Bayless that afternoon and told him he had arranged a buy at the 
Red Duck with defendant (R. 369, 493) . However, when Bayless 
came into the store, at just about the time the buy was supposed 
to take place, defendant, who had been standing around outside, 
came into the store too (R. 305, 371, 494). Black pretended that 
Bayless was an electrician who was there to fix some lights so 
that Bayless could search Black and wire him in the back room (R. 
372, 494-96). 
After both Bayless and a customer left, defendant came up to 
Black and said: *I got it." (R. 377, 502). Black confirmed that 
defendant had an ounce of marijuana and a quarter gram of cocaine 
(R. 213, 307, 377, 502). Defendant then handed a sock to Black 
which defendant said contained the drugs (R. 378). Black did not 
look into the sock at that time but felt something resembling a 
bag of marijuana inside (R. 378-79). Black paid defendant $250 
or $260 for the narcotics (R. 378, 432-33). Defendant left the 
store and went up the hill to his apartment (R. 308, 502). 
After defendant left, Black looked into the sock and found 
the cocaine was missing (R. 310, 381). He told one of the people 
hanging around outside the store to go get defendant (R. 216, 
311, 383, 505). Defendant came in and insisted he put the 
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cocaine on the counter, but they could not find it (R. 219-20, 
312, 385, 507) . Defendant promised to "take care of him" (R. 
313, 326, 385), and in fact, brought Black a quarter gram of 
cocaine the following Saturday (R. 222, 387). 
Officers Bayless, Laplant, and Woodring listened to the 
entire transaction between defendant and Black (R. 206-07, 500, 
502, 524). In addition, all three of the officers could view the 
store from their vantage points (R. 206-07, 502, 522). 
Prior to each buy, Black was searched to ensure he did not 
have any drugs in his possession and all of his money was taken 
(R. 87, 256, 292-93, 358, 487, 496). Following the second buy, 
Black was also given a surprise urine analysis test to ensure he 
was not using drugs (R. 222, 509). The results were negative (R. 
222, 509). 
Defendant testified that although he knew Black, he did not 
sell any drugs to Black on either occasion (R. 545, 553-55) . 
SUMMARY OP ARGUMENT 
There was no plain error in the trial court's allowing the 
prosecutor to comment on the confidential informant's credibility 
in opening statement or to elicit testimony supporting the 
informant's credibility on direct examination. 
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The prosecutor is permitted to present to the jury in 
opening argument an unargumentative overview of the evidence, 
which the prosecutor did by accurately referencing testimony 
elicited in direct examination. That testimony was properly 
elicited because defendant attacked the informant's credibility 
in his opening statement, a circumstance placing this case 
outside the prohibitions of rule 608(a)(2), Utah Rules of 
Evidence, and distinguishing it case from State v. Hovater, 914 
P.2d 37 (Utah 1996), upon which defendant relies exclusively. 
Even if the prosecutor's comment's in opening statement 
amounted to bolstering, such commentary was not improper in the 
circumstances of this case, based on the majority view in the 
federal circuits applying rule 608(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of 
Evidence. Specifically, the prosecutor's remarks in opening 
statement simply anticipated an inevitable attack on the 
informant's credibility, an event fully realized in defendant's 
opening and closing statements and through cross examination. 
Because Hovater is not expressly on point and because the 
opinion was only issued five days prior to trial in this case, 
any error in the trial court's failing to follow it in this case 
could not have been obvious. In any case, because of the 
compelling evidence of defendant's guilt independent of the 
8 
informant's testimony, any error was harmless. 
POINT II 
Defendant has failed to demonstrate that his counsel was 
ineffective. Because there was no error in the trial court's 
allowing the prosecutor to comment or witnesses to testify about 
the confidential informant's credibility, any objection would 
likely have been denied. Thus, defense counsel's failure to 
object cannot be considered deficient perfonnance. Additionally, 
because there was compelling evidence of defendant's guilt 
independent of the informant's testimony, defendant was not 
prejudiced by his counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's 
remarks or the witnesses' testimony. 
ARgVMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO DEMONSTRATE PLAIN ERROR. NOT 
ONLY DID THE STATE NOT IMPROPERLY BOLSTER THE 
CREDIBILITY OF ITS CONFIDENTIAL INFORMANT IN EITHER 
OPENING ARGUMENT OR DURING THE TESTIMONY OF ITS FIRST 
WITNESSES, BUT ALSO ANY ERROR WAS NEITHER OBVIOUS NOR 
PREJUDICIAL. 
At trial, defendant failed to object to the prosecutor's 
supporting the credibility of the State's confidential informant. 
On appeal, defendant now argues that, in violation of rule 
608(a)(2), Utah Rules of Evidence and State v. Hovater. 914 P.2d 
9 
37 (Utah 1996), the trial court committed plain error in allowing 
the prosecutor to improperly bolster Adam Black's credibility in 
its opening statement and during direct testimony of its initial 
witnesses. Appellant's Br. at 8-14. The argument is without 
merit. 
In order to establish plain error and to obtain appellate 
relief from an alleged error that was not properly objected to, 
"the appellant must show the following: (i) An error exists; (ii) 
the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) 
the error is harmful, i.e., absent the error, there is a 
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for the 
appellant." State v. Dunn. 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993) 
(citations omitted). If defendant fails to prove any one of 
these requirements, plain error is not established. Id. at 1209 
(citations omitted). 
A. The Prosecutor did not Improperly Bolster. 
Defendant argues that the State immediately starting 
bolstering Black's credibility in its opening statement, in 
violation of Rule 608(a) (2)2 and Hovater. Appellant's Br. at 9-
2
 Rule 608 provides, in pertinent part: w[E]vidence of 
truthful character is admissible only after the character of the 
witness for truthfulness has been attacked has been attacked by 
opinion evidence or otherwise." Utah R. Evid. 608(a)(2). 
10 
11. Defendant, however, misapprehends the appropriate reach of 
opening argument. In its opening statement, the State did not 
improperly bolster Black's character for truthfulness but merely 
provided the jury with an overview of the facts the State 
intended to prove during its case-in-chief. 
In an opening statement, a party should "give the jury an 
unargumentative overview of the facts the party intends to 
prove." State V, Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239, 1254 (Utah 1988) 
(citing State v, Williams, 656 P.2d 450, 452 (Utah 1982)), cert. 
denial, Cook v. Lafferty, 504 u.s. 911, 112 s.ct. 1942 (1992); 
Rank v. State. 883 S.W.2d 843, 845 (Ark. 1994) (because evidence 
gave way to inference that the defendant's statement was false, 
prosecutor was entitled to refer to it during opening statement). 
This is precisely what the prosecutor did when he explained that 
Black had given officers good information on a number of 
occasions which had eventually lead to arrests (See R. 163-65 for 
pertinent portion of opening statement; attached at Appendix A). 
Indeed, this information was later proven through the testimony 
of Officers Woodring and Laplant during the State's case without 
challenge to its accuracy (R. 190-92, Appendix B; 314-315, 
11 
Appendix C, respectively).3 
Thus, the central question is whether the prosecutor's 
remarks properly referenced properly admitted evidence. 
Defendant relies exclusively on Hovater in support of his claims 
that the prosecutor improperly bolstered Black's character for 
truthfulness in both opening argument and in direct examination. 
In Hovater. a police officer used an informant to purchase 
drugs from Hovater. Hovater. 914 P.2d at 38-39. On direct 
examination the officer testified that the informant had assisted 
him on a number of buys, seven of which had resulted in guilty 
pleas without any suggestion that the informant had planted drugs 
on those convicted. Id. at 40. Hovater's trial attorney did not 
object to the examination, but on appeal Hovater's counsel argued 
ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Id. at 41. 
Specifically, Hovater claimed that the prosecutor had improperly 
3
 Compare Williams, wherein the court also stated: *It is 
not proper to engage in anticipatory rebuttal or to argue 
credibility by referring to impeachment evidence the other side 
may adduce." Williams, 656 P.2d at 452. In Williams, the 
prosecutor commented in opening argument that the defendant's 
companion during the offense had been coerced into signing 
statements stating that the defendant was not involved in the 
robbery. Id. at 452. The prosecutor's remarks about the 
statements were apparently offered to blunt the anticipated 
impeachment of defendant's companion. Id. In contradistinction 
to this case, however, the neither the State nor the defendant 
actually put in evidence the challenged written statements. Id. 
12 
bolstered the informant's credibility before his character for 
truthfulness had been impugned, in violation of rule 608(a) (2). 
Id. The State responded that Hovater had attacked the 
informant's credibility in opening argument, id. 
In reversing Hovater's conviction, the Utah Supreme Court 
first recognized that *a number of jurisdictions with similarly 
worded rules have held that bolstering evidence is admissible 
following an attorney's disparagement of a witness's credibility 
during the attorney's opening argument," citing cases from 
federal4 and state jurisdictions. Hovater. 914 P.2d at 41.5 The 
court found that Hovater's opening statement did not attack the 
informant's credibility for truthfulness. However, without 
disapproving of the authority it had previously cited, the court 
chose not to decide whether the Utah rule should be construed 
consistent with that authority. Rather, the court held that the 
4
 Rule 608(a), Utah Rules of Evidence, is the federal 
rule verbatim. Utah R. Evid. 608 advisory committee note. 
5
 £&£ id*, at 41 (citing United States v. Cruz. 805 F.2d 
1464, 1480 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. Jones. 763 F.2d 
518, 522 (2d Cir. 1985); State v. Van Per Hgyden. 615 A.2d 1246, 
1249 (N.H. 1992); People v. Cherry. 554 N.Y.S.2d 884, 885 
(1990)). 
13 
prosecutor had violated rule 608(b), by bolstering6 the 
informant's credibility on direct examination with specific 
instances of conduct. Id. at 41-42, However, the court 
ultimately held that the error was harmless because there was 
sufficient evidence to convict Hovater entirely apart from the 
informant's testimony. Id. at 43. 
Contrary to defendant's assertion, Hovater is not apposite 
to this case. First, defendant's claim of error in this case is 
based exclusively on rule 608(a)(2). However, Hovater's 
discussion of rule 608(a) is only dictum, since that case was 
decided exclusively on the authority of rule 608(b). Therefore, 
the court's determination of error does not apply to this case. 
However, even if dictum in Hovater. permitting bolstering 
following attack in opening argument, were the rule of law, the 
facts in Hovater would not lead to the same conclusion in this 
case. In Hovater. the court concluded that bolstering the 
informant would be improper because he was not first attacked in 
Hovater's opening argument. In this case, bolstering of Black's 
6
 The court merely assumed that the officer's testimony 
constituted ''bolstering," without analysis. Id. at 43. The 
State concedes that testimony elicited from Officers Woodring and 
Laplant on direct examination about Black's useful information, 
and the prosecutor's brief synopsis of such testimony in opening, 
was substantially the same as the officer's in Hovater. 
14 
character for truthfulness at this point was permissible since 
the resuscitating provision of Rule 608 had been triggered during 
defendant's opening argument. Rule 608 permits the introduction 
of truthful character once the character of the witness for 
truthfulness has been attacked. In his opening statement, 
defense counsel repeatedly made personal attacks on Black's 
credibility (See R. 179-85 for pertinent portion of opening 
statement; attached at Appendix D). He stated: 
Who do you want to believe, the confidential informant 
who has been in prison? (R. 180). 
[W]hat he is getting in return is 'getting restitution 
paid off, is getting off parole, those types of things 
are things in return. ... Those are reasons why this 
confidential informant, who hasn't had an honest 
background, would have possibly to say and do these 
things, because of the convenience that presented itself 
(R. 181-82). 
So again, it comes down to whether this confidential 
informant is actually telling the truth. ... What if he 
was in there and was to get the drugs from someone else 
and come out and say he got them from Mr. Perez or 
another individual? (R. 182). 
So again we are left to listen to Mr. -- to the 
confidential informant and trust what he says. And is 
he someone that we want to trust, and want to believe 
beyond a reasonable doubt that this is the way it 
happened? (R. 184). 
These statements were sufficient to trigger rule 608 and 
15 
allow the State to resuscitate Black's credibility.7 Therefore, 
it would not have been error to allow Blake Woodring or Rodney 
Laplant to testify as to defendant's character for truthfulness, 
although neither in fact did. 
Finally, defendant notes that the Hovater court warned this 
prosecutor that bolstering by use of specific instances of 
conduct of a witness may not be proven by extrinsic evidence. 
Appellant's Br. at 10. However, this Court should not consider 
on appeal whether the State improperly offered extrinsic evidence 
to support Black's credibility in violation of rule 608(b) 
because defendant has not properly raised that issue. Defendant 
makes a passing reference to this portion of the court's holding 
in Hovater and does not specifically allege anywhere in his brief 
that the State improperly elicited extrinsic evidence about 
specific instances of Black's conduct. See State v. Amicone. 689 
P.2d 1341, 1344 (Utah 1984) (refusing to consider issue when no 
legal analysis has been made); State v. Yates. 834 P.2d 599, 602 
7
 Cf. e.g.. ££UZL, 805 F.2d at 1480 (allowing prosecutor to 
bolster witnesses' credibility after defense counsel, during 
opening argument, asserted government's witnesses could not be 
trusted); Jones. 763 F.2d at 522 (allowing prosecutor to 
rehabilitate witnesses on direct examination after defense 
counsel, in opening statement, accused one witness of previously 
committing perjury and questioned whether government witnesses 
had simply wmade a deal to save their own hide"). 
16 
(Utah App. 1992) ("This court has routinely declined to consider 
arguments which are not adequately briefed on appeal."). This 
issue is therefore not properly before this Court. 
Even if the prosecutor's remarks in opening argument and 
Officers Woodring's and Laplant's testimony about Black's "good 
information" constituted "bolstering," those references were 
proper in the context of all the circumstances. Even though the 
question has not been decided in Utah, see Hovater. 914 P.2d at 
41, where the bolstering material also contains the basis for the 
opposing party's impeachment, admission of the evidence has 
generally been upheld. See United States v. Lord. 907 F.2d 1028, 
1029-31 (10th Cir. 1990) (refusing to find plain error and 
following "the majority of circuits [which] allow the government 
to admit evidence of the truthfulness provisions of an agreement 
on direct examination of a witness, prior to any challenge to the 
witness's credibility," under rule 608(a)(2) because "evidence 
concerning a plea agreement and its provisions may have both a 
bolstering and an impeaching effect on the witness's 
credibility); United States v. Oxman. 740 F.2d 1298, 1302-03 (3d 
Cir. 1984) (upholding claimed instances of vouching on direct 
examination since the government could reasonably anticipate 
impeachment), vacated on other grounds. 473 U.S. 922, 105 S.Ct. 
17 
3550 (1985); United States v. Townsend. 796 F.2d 158, 162-63 (6th 
Cir. 1986) (no error in introducing cooperating witness's entire 
plea agreement, containing promises to testify truthfully, upon 
which the witness's credibility could both be bolstered and 
impeached). &££ also United States v, Kramer/ 7ii F.2d 789, 795 
(7th Cir. 1983) (not improper for the prosecutor to discuss 
during opening and closing arguments conditions that support the 
credibility of its witnesses).8 
The holdings in these cases are based on the policy of rule 
608(a)(2). In United States v. Bowie, the court noted: "Fed. R. 
Evid. 608(a)(2) seems primarily concerned with saving time and 
simplifying trials; unless there is a specfic reason to believe 
otherwise, we can safely presume that witnesses tell the truth." 
United States v. Bowie. 892 F.2d 1494, 1499 (10th Cir. 1990) 
(emphasis added). However, where it is apparent that the 
witness's credibility will be challenged, time is not wasted, nor 
8
 Alternatively, at least one court has found, without 
independent consideration of the evidence supporting guilt, that 
although the government's introduction of a cooperation agreement 
on direct examination of its principal witness was error, the 
error was harmless because of the inevitability of an attack on 
the witness's credibility based on his obvious motivation to lie, 
a point which was brought to the jury's attention in the 
defendant's opening and closing statements and through vigorous 
cross examination. See United States v. Arroyo-Angulo. 580 F.2d 
1137, 1146-47 (2d Cir. 1978). 
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is the trial complicated by allowing the prosecutor to 
preemptively comment on the witness's credibility. 
In this case the basis for impeachment was explicit in the 
prosecutor's and witnesses' references to Black, and defendant's 
anticipated impeachment of Black was obvious. The prosecutor 
stated that Black had been in prison, that he was on parole 
during the events at issue, and that he accepted police payment 
for his remaining restitution and for relocation, all prime bases 
for impeachment (R. 163-66). Defendant amply exploited every 
opportunity to impeach Black's credibility on each of these 
points in opening statement (R. 180-85) , in cross examining 
Officer Woodring and Black himself (R. 224-227, 390-97), in his 
own testimony (R. 538-40), and in his closing argument (R. 598-
601). Indeed, as the prosecutor noted, the entire defense was 
based on the theory that Black *set [defendant] up" (R. 617), and 
accordingly, defendant thoroughly attacked Black's credibility. 
In these circumstances, it was not error either to allow the 
prosecutor to modestly comment on Black's credibility in opening 
statement or admit the officers' testimony about Black's "good 
information".9 
9
 Compare Williams, where, in contradistinction to this 
case, the supreme court found objectionable the prosecutor's 
19 
In sum, the prosecutor did not improperly bolster Black's 
character for truthfulness during opening argument, but merely 
provided the jury with an overview of the testimony properly 
elicited from Officers Woodring and Laplant. Further, that 
testimony was elicited after defendant undeniably attacked 
Black's character for truthfulness in opening argument, in 
circumstances where impeachment could reasonably be anticipated 
based on Black's background and acceptance of benefits in 
exchange for information. Thus, there was no error in the trial 
court's allowing the prosecutor's comments in opening argument or 
the officers' testimony regarding the accuracy of Black's 
information. 
B. Even If there was Error, it was not Obvious. 
Defendant also claims that the alleged errors should have 
been obvious to the trial court because the prosecutor's comments 
during opening statement *were clearly intended to prove that 
Adam Black was a truthful person." Appellant's Br. at 11. 
Defendant also argues that the trial court.should have been 
particularly aware that these statements were impermissible since 
anticipatory rebuttal of defense evidence which the defense never 
introduced or relied on in impeaching the witness's testimony. 
Williams^ 656 p.2d at 452. 
20 
it had been "warned by the Supreme Court in Hovater only five 
days earlier." Id. 
However, the short period of time that elapsed between the 
release of the ftovater slip opinion and the start of defendant's 
trial does not make the alleged error more obvious but in fact 
tends to mitigate against a finding of obviousness. The Hovater 
decision was released a mere five days before the start of 
defendant's trial and its holding was dealt only with the 
admissibility of specific instances of conduct under Rule 608(b), 
not at issue here.10 Thus, if the prosecutor did improperly 
bolster Black's credibility, the error cannot be regarded as 
sufficiently obvious so as to trigger application of the plain 
error rule. 
C. Because Evidence of Defendant's Guilt was Compelling 
Even Without the Confidential Informant's Testimony. 
Any Error in Bolstering was, at Most. Harmless, 
Finally, defendant asserts the prosecutor's alleged errors 
were "extremely prejudicial" to defendant and "cannot be said to 
have been harmless." Appellant's Br. at 13-14. He specifically 
10
 Defendant also claims the alleged error should have 
been obvious to Mr. Daines who was the prosecutor in Hovater. 
Appellant's Br. at 11. Yet, the relevant test is whether the 
error was obvious to the trial court. See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 
1208. It is thus irrelevant whether the prosecutor was aware of 
any error. 
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claims that the prosecutor's statements wgave undue weight" to 
Black's testimony, and without that information, "the jury was 
left only with the word of an ex-convict." Appellant's Br. at 
18. Defendant further suggests there was ua lack of 
corroborating evidence on at least one of the convictions." Id. 
Not only has defendant failed to show that, absent this 
alleged error, there was a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable outcome, but his claims that Black's testimony was 
uncorroborated are wholly unsupported by the record. The record 
reveals the case against defendant was based upon the testimony 
of Black as well as Officers Woodring, Elliott, Laplant, and 
Bayless, all of whom corroborated Black's testimony. Even 
without Black's testimony, the jury had compelling evidence to 
convict defendant on the basis of the officers' testimony along 
with expert testimony from Arthur Terkelson that the substances 
received from defendant were marijuana. See Hovater. 914 P.2d at 
43 (finding jury had enough evidence to convict defendant without 
the confidential informant's testimony). 
Agent Laplant, who was positioned at a different location, 
was able to hear most of the conversation between defendant and 
Black (R. 294). Agent Laplant, Blake Woodring's partner, had 
done several curfew checks on defendant with Woodring and had 
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also talked to defendant a couple of times at the Adult Probation 
& Parole Office (R. 290). Agent Laplant had no trouble 
recognizing defendant's voice over the transmitter (R. 299). 
Laplant heard Black ask defendant if he had "his stuff," and 
defendant responded that he did (R. 300)• There was wno question 
whatsoever" in Officer Laplant's mind that it was defendant's 
voice he heard (R. 300); he was na hundred percent sure" (R. 
322) . 
Officer Bayless, Black's controlling agent on the Strike 
Force, testified about the second buy that was arranged between 
Black and defendant on November 13, 1995 (R. 493). From where he 
was positioned in the alley, Officer Bayless could see defendant 
in the store (R. 522). He also heard the conversation between 
Black and defendant on a receiver in his truck (R. 502) . He 
noted the person speaking to Black was the same person that he 
had just seen speaking to Black in the store (R. 502), and the 
same person Black had identified as Raymond Perez, the defendant 
(R. 494). There was no question in Bayless's mind it was the 
same voice (R. 502) -11 He heard Black ask defendant if he had 
11
 After the buy, when Black discovered that the cocaine 
was missing and defendant came back down to the store to look for 
the missing crank, Bayless heard defendant's voice again (R. 
507)• Again, he was sure it was the same voice (R. 507). 
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"the stuff"; defendant said "yeah"; Black asked if it was an 
ounce of marijuana and a quarter gram of crank, and defendant 
said it was (R. 502). Bayless then visually observed defendant 
leave the store (R. 502). 
Agent Laplant was also involved with the second buy at the 
Red Duck (R. 304). Agent Laplant easily identified defendant 
when he entered the store just prior to the transaction (R. 3 05, 
323). Laplant also distinctly heard the conversation between 
Black and defendant (R. 317). He heard Black ask defendant if he 
had "the stuff," and defendant said he had an ounce of marijuana 
and a gram of coke (R. 307). Laplant recognized the defendant's 
voice and noted it was the same voice he had heard on October 30, 
1995 during the first buy (R. 307). 
Finally, Agent Woodring corroborated Black's testimony. 
Woodring was defendant's parole officer and accordingly, knew 
defendant well and could easily recognize his voice (R. 194-96). 
Agents Woodring and Laplant observed the second transaction from 
outside the Red Duck and listened to defendant's conversation 
with Black over the wire attached to Black (R. 206-07). Woodring 
was certain he heard defendant's voice on the bug (R. 212). He 
heard defendant say he had "the stuff," which was a quarter gram 
of cocaine and an ounce of marijuana (R. 213). There was no 
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question in Woodring's mind it was defendant's voice he heard (R. 
213, 220, 239, 246). In addition, Woodring got a full view of 
defendant and positively identified him (R. 213). He was uone 
hundred percent sure" it was defendant he saw exit the store 
following the buy (R. 246). 
In sum, there was compelling evidence for the jury to find 
defendant guilty absent any alleged error. Black's testimony was 
corroborated by four other officers, all of whom were involved in 
at least one of the transactions. Defendant has not made the 
requisite showing of prejudice and thus cannot prevail on his 
plain error claim. See Dunn. 850 P.2d at 1209 ("If any one of 
these requirements is not met, plain error is not established."). 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT FAILS TO DEMONSTRATE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE 
OF COUNSEL 
Defendant also claims he was denied his Sixth Amendment 
right to effective assistance of counsel because his trial 
counsel's failure to object to "the blatant bolstering of the 
confidential informant's truthfulness" prejudiced him. 
Appellant's Br. at 15-18. 
In State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990), the Utah 
Supreme Court adopted the two-part test set out in Strickland v. 
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Washington 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 (1984), in evaluating a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The defendant must 
first "identify the acts or omissions" which, under the 
circumstances, "show that counsel's representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 186. This 
requires a showing that counsel's errors were so serious that he 
was not functioning as "counsel" as guaranteed by the Sixth 
Amendment. Id. Secondly, the defendant "must show that there is 
a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. 
A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine 
confidence in the outcome." Id. 186-87. The defendant has the 
burden of proof with respect to both prongs of the Strickland 
test. Id. at 186. Defendant has failed to carry the burden with 
respect to both of these parts. 
As demonstrated above in the plain error analysis, defendant 
cannot establish prejudice under the second prong of the 
Strickland test. £&£ Strickland. 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S. Ct. at 
2064 (1984). Defendant has not shown there was a reasonable 
likelihood of a more favorable verdict absent his trial counsel's 
failure to object to the State's alleged bolstering, and the 
record contains compelling evidence of defendant's guilt. Nor 
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can defendant meet the first part of the Strickland test, since 
his trial counsel's performance did not fall below an objective 
standard of reasonableness. See 466 U.S. at 687-88, 104 S. Ct. 
at 2064. Had defendant's trial counsel objected to the State's 
alleged bolstering, such an objection, as discussed in Point 1(A) 
of this brief, would likely have been overruled. *[T]he failure 
of counsel to make motions or objections which would be futile if 
raised does not constitute ineffective assistance." Codianna v. 
Morris. 660 P.2d 1101, 1109 (Utah 1983) (quoting State v. 
Malmrose. 649 P.2d 56, 58 (Utah 1982)).. Certainly, the question 
of whether an objection was proper here is sufficiently close 
that failing to object or simply choosing not to object does not 
fall below "an objective standard of reasonable professional 
judgment." State v. Germonto, 868 P.2d 50, 61 (Utah 1993). 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the State requests that this Court 
find defendant's claims without merit and affirm his convictions. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 7~C day of April, 1997. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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be unusual tor me or my witnesses to run into one of you. It 
we appear to be avoiding you like the plague, that's because 
we are supposed to be doing that. That has nothing to do with) 
what we think about you. And during the course of the 
proceedings here there will be times that we will take breaks 
during the middle of the day. There is only one door in and 
out of here, so please just look upon it that way, and we will! 
8
 I try to move through it as quickly as we can so we will get you] 
9
 " out as quickly as we can. 
In January of 1995 a young man by the name of Adam Black, 
who was the undercover agent in this case, was on parole out 
of the Utah State Prison to a parole officer by the name of 
Blake Woodring who works here in Ogden right across the street] 
in the State Building for the Adult Parole and Probation 
department. He went to him and he said, look, I am out on 
parole. I am working up the street at the Red Duck. The Red 
Duck, for those of you who may not know where this particular 
Red Duck is, is on the corner of Adams and 26th Street. It 
kind of sits on the hill. It isn»t on the street. And it 
sits kitty-cornered to the edge of Adams and 26th Street. 
He said I am up in this store. A lot of people are 
beginning to approach me and doing various things and offering] 
to sell me stolen property, offering to sell me drugs. And by] 
the way, there is some guy up there running around right now 




















Blake Woodring asked him about the last of the matters, 
who is this guy? Can you help us with him? With no agreement] 
for him to be an undercover gent or anything, he simply gave 
the parole department the information about this person from 
Oregon who was passing bad checks. As it turns out, he is a 
person who was wanted in three different states, and has been 
convicted of 11 separate counts of forgery in three different 
8
 I states. And ended up getting Blake Woodring a medal from the 
Department of Corrections over his assistance in catching this] 
guy. That's how the Parole Department found out about him. 
And then subsequently, or after that, the Weber-Morgan 
Narcotics Strike force became acquainted with Adam Black's 
ability as an undercover agent. Adam Black has been in 
prison. He was in prison with this Defendant. And that's how] 
he knows this Defendant. It happens that this Defendant was 
living in an apartment right next door to the Red Duck when 
Adam Black was working there. That's how this case arises. 
But before the case arose, Adam, who happens to come from] 
a little bit different background than some of the street 
kids, he comes from a very wealthy family. Although he gets 
none of the money himself, his father is extremely wealthy in 
the State of Texas. And that was known when he was in prison. 
So if you are wondering why would all of these people come to 
Adam Black, he has the reputation of at least coming from a 




And he was in prison. When he came out of prison, he 
began seeing people with whom he had been in prison. And he 
started dropping by Blake Woodring1s office and giving him 
information. You cannot use a parolee as an undercover agent 
just on the decision of a parole agent. It is prohibited by 
the Corrections Department. But because of all of the 
information that Adam Black kept giving the Parole Department, 
and because of the fact that all of this information was 
turning out to be good information, Blake Woodring applied to 
the administrative offices in Salt Lake to permit Adam Black 
to work undercover. 
Now Adam Black requested absolutely nothing of the Parole 
Department to this point, to the point that he had been giving 
all of this information, including the guy from Oregon, had 
asked for absolutely nothing. Blake Woodring said to Adam, I 
am going to apply to let you be an undercover agent because of 
all of the information that you seem to be able to get. And 
all of the information that you may be able to get in the 
future. But you will not do this for nothing. We donft have 
agents work for nothing. So if you go to work as an 
undercover agent for us, we will pay off. And this is 
basically the agreement they have with him, $195.00 in 
restitution that he still owed on the burglary that he had 




Blake Vfoodring's Direct testimony 





A Mr. Black has never had a positive urine sample. 
Q All right. Now in January of 1995—I assume that 
your relationship with Mr. Black between October of '94 and 
January of '95 was the standard parole officer? 
5
 || A He was on I.S.P. which is intensive supervision, 
which requires more home visits, more office visits. And he 
was on that for a period of six months when he was first 
8
 I  released. 
Q In January, though, of 1995, did your relationship 
with Mr. Black change? 
A Yes. 
12
 || Q Describe for the Jury what happened in that time? 
13


















He informed me at that time that he had a person staying with 
him off and on who was a parole fugitive and probation 
fugitive. He was a parole fugitive from the State of Oregon 
and probation fugitive from Salt Lake City. He was cashing 
forged checks at that time. He stated that this individual 
had shown him how he was doing it, and was cashing checks now 
in the Ogden area. 
He was aware that Mr.—that the individual's name was 
Raymond Lindbrick, had done about ten checks here in the Ogden 
area. One of those checks he was able to obtain a brand new 
Toyota Corolla. Mr. Black gave me information where he was 




Based upon the information Mr. Black provided to me, I 
was able to do surveillance and find the individual. Followed! 
his vehicle, pulled it over, and took him into custody. And 
confiscated evidence that led to convictions in the States of 
Washington, Oregon and Utah. 
Q Did you receive any award for that? 
A Yes, I did. I received a medal of merit provided by| 
the Department of Corrections. 
Q Now so the Jury knows, and some of them might know, 
you are a category 1 police officer? 
A I am. 
Q Parole and probation supervising officers in Utah 
are peace officers? 
A The majority of them are. 
Q Okay. And you were in that position, is that 
correct? 
A Uh-huh. I finished the Police Academy in December 
of f94. 
Q So much of what you do is basically police work? 
A Correct. 
Q In supervising these people. 
A That's right. 
Q All right. Now after January of 1995 when this 




A He did* Mr. Black has a unique ability to talk to 
people and gain their trust. Over the next few months he 
would let me know—he would come and ask me if certain 
individuals were on the run, if they were fugitives from 
justice, and provided me information on various fugitives in 
the Ogden area. 
Q Did that information turn out to be correct or 
incorrect insofar as you were able to check it? 
A The majority of the time it was correct information. 
Usually—at that time they had started the NUCAT, the Northern] 
Utah Criminal Apprehension Team. 
Q You better tell the Jury what that is, just very 
quickly. 
A It is run by the F.B.I. An enforcement agency made 
up of officers from the various agencies in the Weber-Davis 
County areas. And their main job is to chase fugitives that 
are on the run on probation and parole and failure to appear 
in court. 
Q And was that information that he was giving you 
leading to the capture of people? 
A Oh some occasions, yes. The other occasions it 
didn't materialize. 
Q Did you ever find he wasn't telling the truth? 








 monitoring the bug and paying attention to Adam. That was 
2
 specifically—that's what he was doing. 
3
 | Q Okay. Now were you there when—did Lyle eventually 
get to that store? 
6
 || A Yes, he did. 
Q And did you see Lyle go in there? 
A I did see Lyle go in. 
8
 || Q Did you have any more to do with this case on that 
9
 " day? 
10
 II A N o . 
Q And have you had any more to do with Adam Black as 
12
 || pertains to this defendant since that day? 
13
 || A Well, with Adam, yes. I have dealt with Adam. I 
14
 " have also dealt with Ray up to the point he went back to the 
prison 
Q Okay. You didn't make any more buys from him after 
that insofar as you know? 
A As far as I know, there was one additional buy, but 
the clarity there is, you know—• 
Q Did you continue to work Adam? 
A Yes. 
Q How many different casess? 
A Numerous different cases. 
Q How many different times did you go along like you 














Rodney Laplant's Direct Testimony 
concerning Adam Black 
A Just about every one of them. I think I only misse^ 
two or three, maybe not even that many. I mean I was there 
on—I was one of the controlling officers through the whole 
thing* 
Q And Adam did a lot of people? 
A Yes, he did. 
Q Is that fair? 
A Yeah, he did. He did a lot of people. Not just in 
that one area, but he did numerous people in Ogden. 
Q And many of them are now in prison? 
A Yes. 
MR. DAINES: Thank you, nothing further. 
THE COURT: Cross. 
MR. MILES: Thank you. 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. MILES: 
Q Mr. Laplant, you indicated that through your fault, 
or whatever, no report was prepared, no notes were taken, that} 
type of thing, is that correct? 
A That's correct. 
Q Why—tell me again why on something like this you 
don't—obviously it is numerous months since this occurred, 
wouldn't it be helpful to have a report or some notes to refeif 
to? 








Ladies and Gentlemen of the Jury, I want to thank you in 
advance for the time and for your consideration in listening 
to the evidence here today. I am representing Mr. Perez, 
Raymond Perez, who ve anticipate you will hear later on either] 
today or tomorrow state what happened. He was there on 
occasions and he knows what happened. 
You won't hear other witnesses. That we anticipate at 
8
 I this time, due to the fact that this was a situation where 
this Defendant knew Adam Black, he lived by the Red Duck where] 
this took place, he would state that he was there a number of 
times. His apartment was up the hill from that. He is very 
12











there. It was not surprising for him to be in that area. Anq 
14
 I you will hear him explain that. 
15
 " We ar here today. It is the State's burden obviously, as] 
16 the Judge indicated, to prove Mr. Perez is guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. It is not our job to prove him innocent. 
It is our job to make sure that the evidence that the State 
has is not just given to you and our version, or Mr. Perez' 
version of what happened is not left for you to wonder what 
happened. He is going to take the stand, and he is going to 
tell you, even though it is the State's burden to prove him 
guilty. 
Initially, Ladies and Gentlemen, you will hear that Mr. 
Perez did meet this confidential informant—and frankly that 
81 
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is where the case comes down to. Who do you want to believe, 
the confidential informant, who Mr. Daines from the State 
indicated has been in prison. He has been there on a burglary) 
charge. And he is now out of prison. And he is passing this 
information along to the State. 
Either he is telling the truth or Mr. Perez is telling 
the truth, that he did not do these things which the 
confidential informant is saying he did do those things. This] 
is basically what this comes down to, Ladies and Gentlemen. 
The information that you will hear from Mr. Perez, the 
testimony that he will give, is that he did live at 2560 
Adams, apartment number 4. And that is critical when we get 
into the evidence. You will see that the reports made by the 
officers, the information given by the confidential informant 
is not consistent. There are discrepancies in the apartment 
number they go to. And I think you heard Mr. Daines indicate 
well maybe one report it said number 2, but he does live in 
number 4. Those are the issues that are going to be important] 
here today. Mr. Perez does live at 2560 Adams, number four, 
which is right up the street from the Red Duck convenience 
store. 
You will hear him indicate that he was in the convenience! 
store a number of times. That he did know Adam from prison. 
Not very well. You will hear him indicate that he remembers 
him, knows who he was, but it wasn't like they had an 
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acquaintance where they would get together after. This was a 
situation that he recognized or knew Mr. Black, the 
confidential informant, when he went into the Red Duck. But 
he did spend a lot of time there going in and out. 
But you will also hear that Mr. perez has never been 
involved in drug offenses, has never been convicted or charged| 
with any drug offenses. And that he did not on these two 
occasions the State is indicating, did not in any way 
participate in selling drugs to the confidential informant. 
Again, it is not our burden to prove that he did not sell| 
these drugs. There may be some questions as to why the 
confidential informant would make the accusations against the 
Defendant, against Mr. Perez. The State in their testimony, 
and from what Mr. Daines has indicated in his opening, is that] 
he just is doing this just basically to be a good guy. That 
he is the one that approached his parole officer and said, 
hey, I want to do some of this stuff. 
Well, frankly the information that he has given, what he 
is getting in return is getting restitution paid off, is 
getting off parole, those type of things are things in return. 
Now whether the State wants you to understand that he 
didn't anticipate getting any of these things or not, those 
are motives. Those are reasons why this confidential 
informant, who hasn't had an honest background, would have 



























 I convenience that presented itself. 
2
 " On the first occasion which they have charged, which is 
alleged to have occurred on October 30th, the information that| 
we were given is this occurred at 2560 Porter number 2, 
apartment number 2. That is not where the Defendant lives. 
The Defendant lives at 2560 Adams apartment number 4. This is| 
information coming directly from the confidential informant 
who supposedly went into this apartment. 
Again, you won't hear testimony from anyone else other 
than the confidential informant that Mr. perez was in this 
apartment number 2. And he is the one that he got the drugs 
from. There is no other witnesses that are going to come and 
say, yes, I saw Mr. Perez there. He is the one that gave the 
drugs. 
So again, it comes down to whether this confidential 
informant is actually telling the truth. The way these drug 
buys, as they call it go down, presents itself to having to 
trust a confidential informant in a situation like this, tfhatl 
if he was in there and was to get the drugs from someone else 
and come out and say he got them from Mr. Perez or another 
individual? That's what the agents and whoever is monitoring 
the situation goes by. 
You will not hear a tape that is played that will have 
Mr. Perez' voice on it. That would be fairly easy to do if in 
fact this went down the way they said it did. If they are 
84 
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monitoring it, and in fact presented him with a tape to record] 
it, where is it? We could all decide for ourselves once Mr. 
Perez takes the stand if that is his voice. And you could 
make the decision based on that. 
So again, we are left to Mr. Black, what he said is the 
way it went down. Well, that is not the way it went down. Hej 
is the only one who saw him supposedly on the first occasion. 
And he does not even give the correct information as to where 
Mr. Perez lives or the apartment number. Now whether he did 
this in apartment number 2, or other individuals were 
involved, I am not here to say. But it did not happen the way] 
he said it happened. 
On the second occasion again, which was some, oh, two 
weeks later, on November 13th, when you heard Mr. Daines 
explain the controlled buy supposedly at the Red Duck 
convenience store. Mr. Perez is not going to deny he was in 
the Red Duck. There is no question that he was there. He was 
there two or three times a week he indicated. So that may 
very well have happened that he was in there on the occasion 
that Mr. Bayless saw him in the store on the occasion. 
But again we are left to Mr. Bayless leaving and the 
confidential informant dealing directly with Mr. Perez. And 
the situation going down the way that the confidential 
informant says it goes down. 









they didn't push the record button. I don't know what 
happened. But again we are left to listen to Mr. Black give 
his version of how it occurred at the Red Duck convenience 
5
 II store. 
6
 I As he said, there was a number of people coming in and 
out all the time he was making buys left and right. Who 
8
 || knows, maybe some controlled, maybe some on his own. I don't 
9
 know what—who the other individuals were that were in there. 
10
 || But on the second offense as Mr. Daines even indicates 
before they could even speak with Mr. Perez—or excuse me, 
12
 || with the confidential informant about this supposed drug buy 
13
 || that went down with Mr. Perez, another individual came in and 
sold the confidential informant drugs. Because he turns over 
drugs to the Strike Force after this happened is not proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt that it was from—Mr. Perez whom he 
got these drugs from. So again we are left to listen to Mr.—| 
to the confidential informant and trust what he says. And is 
he someone that we want to trust, and we want to believe 
beyond a reasonable doubt that this is the way it happened? 
The testimony that we have, Ladies and Gentlemen, we 
don't have ten or twelve witnesses to put on the stand to back! 
up anything that Mr. Perez says. Because frankly the way this 
happened, there would be nobody available, no one to do that. 















He is not denying he goes in the Red Duck. He is not 
denying he lives in apartment number 4. So you will hear him 
testify he is not involved in selling the confidential 
informant drugs. 
And based upon the inaccuracies and discrepancies in the 
way the reports were made, and the way the information was 
relayed from the confidential informant to the officers, that 
there are a number of inconsistencies that just don't jibe 
into having Mr. Perez be found guilty of these offenses. 
And it is your job as Jurors to make that determination, 
to decide if it has been proven beyond a reasonable doubt 
based upon the testimony that you will hear. 
Thank you. 
THE COURT: All right, Members of the Jury, we are 
going to take a lunch recess at this point. We are going to 
reconvene at 1:30. Part of the reason we take that time is 
there is some other business that the Court has to take care 
of during the lunch hour. 
I again need to admonish you not to discuss the case with 
anyone during the break. You are free to have lunch with one 
another. And you are not required to stay together as a Jury. 
You can go on your own way. If you eat lunch together or go 
with someone else, you are not to discuss among yourselves 
what you have heard from the attorneys in their opening 
statements. 
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